This study examines macro-economic developments around reversals in current account deficits in 29 OECD countries over four decades and draws some inferences for the present US deficit. Estimates of a probit model indicate that the deepness of the deficit itself, absence of spare production capacity and a beginning real depreciation are factors that increase the likelihood of a current account reversal in the following year. For the US each of these three indicators of a reversal are now on, making a near reversal probable. Over the past 40 years half of the current account deficit reversals in the OECD area were followed by a recession in the countries concerned.
Introduction
Fears of a 'hard landing' of the US dollar have intensified with the growing size of the US current account deficit. In 2005, the deficit amounted to $ 805 billion, which is equivalent to 6.4% of GDP. Fears are that eventually, financial markets may not be able to accommodate such a large current account imbalance as smoothly as they have done until now. If investors are no longer willing to finance the US deficit, a depreciation of the dollar is imminent. Bergsten (2004) , among others, argues that, if such depreciation does not materialize soon, the dollar's fall will be more substantial. Strong dollar depreciation would raise US inflation and interest rates (at least in the short term) considerably. The situation would even worsen if combined with a further increase in oil prices and stronger US trade protectionism. Given these facts and fears of the US current account deficit, economists ask themselves when a reversal of the US current account will occur and whether or not it would lead to painful economic adjustments, such as a sizeable output decline and disruptive dollar depreciation. This paper analyses the likelihood of a US current account reversal. To this end, we examine episodes of current account deficit reversals in the OECD member countries 1 during the period . In particular, the analysis focuses on the factors that determine the probability of a current account reversal versus the probability that a deficit is sustained (a 'non-reversal'). Such analysis may help drawing some conclusions for the present US current account deficit. The contribution of our paper vis-à-vis the existing literature is that we take into account a longer time period (by including the 1960s), consider a different set of countries (all OECD countries), define a control group of non-reversals to allow comparison between reversals and non-reversals, and consider the effects of exchange rate regimes and financial openness.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 offers a brief literature overview of studies on current account deficit reversals in industrialized countries. In Section 3 the definition of a current account reversal is introduced, and a control group of non-reversals is constructed. In Section 4 macroeconomic developments around the time of a reversal are compared to developments around a non-reversal. Furthermore, the probability of a reversal is econometrically analyzed using a probit regression analysis. This section also considers the post-reversal adjustment period and especially the fall in GDP growth and the currency depreciation during reversal episodes. Section 5 draws some implications for the US and looks at the factors which make it a unique case. Section 6 concludes.
Literature overview
There is a growing number of studies on the determinants and economic consequences of the US current account (CA) deficit. This section discusses a number of recent papers (summarized in Table 1 ) examining CA reversals in OECD-countries including the US 2 , a few of which also drawing inferences for the US case.
[ Table 1 about here]
Freund (2000) examines 25 episodes of large CA adjustments. Such reversals occur typically when the CA deficit reaches 5 percent of GDP and they lead to decreasing output growth and substantial depreciation over three years after the reversal. Further, reversals were typically characterized by a substantial output growth decline and a 10 to 20 percent real depreciation of the currency. Freund defines a CA reversal as (see Table 1 ) an episode where the CA deficit exceeding two percent of GDP is reduced by at least 2 percent of GDP during an adjustment period of 3 years. In addition, the maximum deficit five years after the reversal should be smaller than the minimum deficit in the three years before the reversal. Finally, the CA must be reduced by a third or more over the adjustment period. Edwards (2004) also finds that the probability of experiencing abrupt CA reversals is closely linked to the size of current account deficits.
Goldman Sachs (2005) concludes that in general growth losses resulting from CA reversals are substantial when an overheating of the economy (defined as a widening of the output gap by more than 3 percentage points) has caused the CA deficit. Hence, the economy's starting point matters a lot for the consequences of a CA reversal. Goldman Sachs argues that the US current position is not a direct threat as long as a US CA reversal starts soon, before the US economy gets overheated. The adjustment will require a significant real depreciation.
2 CA adjustments are more severe in developing countries (Edwards, 2004) . One reason is that foreign debt is often denominated in foreign currency and countries suffer greater balance-sheet deterioration (Chinn and Prasad, 2000) . Another explanation is that because of the greater uncertainty about monetary policy and budget insolvency, there is greater financial volatility (Croke et al, 2005) . This reasoning is not applicable to OECD-countries (such as the US). Therefore, this paper focuses on OECD member countries only. Freund and Warnock (2005) , Debelle and Galati (2005) and Croke et al. (2005 ) extend Freund's (2000 initial analysis by examining the influence of financial variables, such as financial flows, long-term interest rates and equity prices. Freund and Warnock (2005) conclude that the composition of financial flows does not have a systematic predictive power for CA adjustments. Debelle and Galati find that domestic macro factors do not significantly help to predict CA adjustments. However, they note that their regression results suffer from the small number of observations and heterogeneity. Surprisingly, Croke et al. show that though some CA adjustment episodes led to substantial decreases in GDP growth, these periods were not associated with a sustained real depreciation. By contrast, they find that it was among the episodes in which GDP growth increased during the CA adjustment that the most significant depreciations occurred. Edwards (2005b) argues, however, that all industrial countries that have gone through reversals have experienced sharp GDP growth reductions.
Even three years after the reversals, GDP growth was still below its long term level.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) do not explicitly examine the probability of a current account reversal. However, they do give insight into the economic consequences of a US CA reversal. They take a general equilibrium perspective and show that under a most realistic scenario the rise in savings required to close up the US current account deficit would entail a potential depreciation of the trade-weighted dollar of up to 40% with severe consequences for economic growth.
In sum, these studies give a mixed assessment of the imminence of a US CA reversal and its economic consequences. Some studies state that there is not enough ground to consider the current US CA deficit as an immediate threat, provided that the CA adjustment begins soon. However, all studies agree that the US is a special case because of its CA deficit's size and the huge capital flows needed to finance it.
Definition of a CA reversal
We follow, with some modifications, the CA reversal as defined by Freund (2000 Freund ( , 2005 , which imposes the following five criteria:
1. The CA deficit/GDP ratio in the year of the reversal (year 0) has to be greater than two percent and larger than the ratio in the previous year (year -1).
2. The average CA deficit/GDP ratio in the second, third and fourth year after the reversal (year 2, 3, 4) is at least two percentage points lower than the value in the reversal year (year 0).
3. The average CA deficit/GDP ratio in each of the five years following the reversal year (year 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) has to be smaller than the value in the reversal year (year 0).
4. The average CA deficit/GDP ratio in the second, third and fourth year after the reversal (year 2, 3, 4) is at least one third lower than the value in the reversal year (year 0).
5. There is not another reversal in the three years before the reversal (year -3, -2, -1).
The first criterion ensures that only substantial CA deficits are taken into consideration.
Criteria 2 to 4 make sure that a significant and sustained CA improvement follows. The fifth criterion ensures that there are no subsequent reversals. Sequences of reversals would pose problems to the analysis as it would make the determination of pre-and post-reversal episodes ambiguous. Applying these five criteria on our sample of 29 countries, 41 reversals are identified. Twelve countries experienced more than one CA reversal, whereas Australia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg and the Netherlands did not go through any reversal (Table 2a) .
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In order to assess both the probability and the economic impact of a reversing current account deficit, a control group is defined. This group consists of episodes in which the current account deficit worsens but does not subsequently reverse. Therefore, non-reversals should satisfy the first criterion for a reversal but not satisfy the second through fourth criterion. Furthermore, the fifth criterion is adapted: there should not be a reversal in the four years after the non-reversal (year 1, 2, 3, 4) and there should not be a non-reversal in the three years before the non-reversal (year -3, -2, -1). The sample includes 31 such episodes (Table   3 To increase the number of observations, we considered including 'inverse' reversals, i.e. mirror images of reversals characterized by large CA surpluses reversing into lower surpluses or deficits (instead of the other way around). This idea was suggested by Clemens Kool. In this way we could add 23 inverse reversals and 19 controls to our dataset. Unfortunately, regular and inverse reversals turned out to be asymmetrical in terms of the macroeconomic trends surrounding both types of events, which made the results disappointing. 2b). The last columns of Table 2a and b, giving the CA deficit in the third year after the reversal or non-reversal, show that, by construction, large CA deficits persist or increase even further in non-reversal episodes while they diminish in reversal episodes.
[ Table 2b about here]
Macro-economic developments around reversals
In this section we present an analysis of macroeconomic developments three years before and three years after CA reversals and non-reversals, respectively. The choice of the macroeconomic variables to be considered reflects identities a nd some basic theoretical economic relationships involving the current account.
The current account CA can be written as the sum of the balance of goods and services plus the income balance:
where (E -M) is exports minus imports of goods and services and r the rate of return on net foreign assets NFA. Adding and subtracting domestic expenditures and rearranging terms yield the well-known identity:
where Y is gross domestic product, C private consumption expenditure, G government expenditure, and I private investment. Identity (2) shows that a current account deficit occurs when national saving falls short of private investment: 0 SI −<. A current account deficit (surplus) is always matched by a surplus (deficit) on the capital account, i.e. a decrease (increase) of the level of NFA:
The government's contribution to gross national savings is, by definition, the government balance. This can be seen when we both subtract and add taxes T in (2):
We disregard current transfers, for simplicity. 5 We disregard non-tax government income and transfers. (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002) , the first stating that the steady state current account should be in balance:
and the second reading:
where e is the real exchange rate 6 and X is a set of determining factors. Equation (6) says that,
given the values for X, the real exchange rate will be lower the higher the steady state goods and services surplus. Equations (5) and (6) can then be solved to yield:
which means that, ceteris paribus, the real exchange rate is increasing in the net foreign asset position of the country. Hence, a persistently high current account deficit, by draining the net foreign asset position, will lead to depreciation.
In view of the above identities and assumptions, and following most of the existing literature, we take the following macroeconomic variables into consideration when estimating a model for predicting current account reversals: GDP, exports and imports of goods and services, incoming and outgoing foreign portfolio investment (being a major and interest sensitive component of foreign assets), private consumption, private investment, the government balance 7 , national saving, the (nominal or real 8 ) interest rate, the real exchange rate, and inflation itself (being incorporated already in the real interest rate and the real 6 The exchange rate is denoted as the amount of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. 7 The government balance is used, which is equal to government expenditure minus taxes. In equation (2), the government balance can be obtained by subtracting T from both Y and G. 8 The real interest rate is measured ex post, i.e. as the difference between the nominal interest rate and the current inflation rate.
exchange rate). We also consider the output gap because if Y is constrained upwards by capacity limits, a country is more likely to run into a current account deficit.
An analysis of developments just before reversals may be helpful to assess which macroeconomic factors increase the likelihood of a CA reversal. An evaluation of the dynamics following a reversal, on the other hand, may reveal the economic impact of reversals on variables such as output and the exchange rate. 
Indicators of a CA reversal
We particularly search for macroeconomic variables that behave differently just before reversals and non-reversals. Such variables may serve as indicators of current account reversals.
First of all, the current account itself naturally behaves differently before reversals and non-reversals. In both cases, the CA deficit increases quite substantially in the three years (years -3, -2, -1) before the reversal/non-reversal year (confirmed by the significance tests in Appendix C). However, in the reversal case the maximum CA deficit is almost twice as large as in the non-reversal case. This suggests that a higher level of the deficit makes a reversal more probable. This is consistent with the finding of Freund (2000) and Edwards (2004) .
Real GDP growth rates move in opposite directions before reversals and nonreversals: growth decelerates in the case of a reversal and accelerates in the case of a non-reversal. This may indicate that the stance of the business cycle is important for the probability of a reversal versus a non-reversal. In fact, in the years before a reversal, the output gap (defined as the percent deviation of the actual output from potential output) is positive, which means that there is no spare capacity left in the economy. The starting point in the non-reversal case is just the opposite; however, the gap levels are equal in the year of the reversal and non-reversal. Together with the above observations on growth, the conclusion seems warranted that reversals tend to occur just after the peaks of the business cycle, whereas non-reversals occur just after the troughs. As mentioned before, Goldman-Sachs (2005) indicated the importance of the output gap for the adjustment path after reversals.
In both the reversal and non-reversal case the real effective exchange rate (REER)
appreciates shortly before year -1. However, one year before the reversal (year -1) the exchange rate already starts to depreciate while appreciation continues in the non-reversal case. The one-year lag between the depreciation and the CA reversal reflects the so-called Jcurve effect: it takes time for the trade balance to adjust to the terms of trade improvement.
Hence, lagged levels of the change in REER may be an indicator of a reversal.
The government's contribution to gross national savings is, by definition, the government balance (see equation (4)). The figure shows that governments typically run budget deficits in the years of growing CA deficits. On average, the government deficit worsens before a CA reversal and slightly improves before a non-reversal. This could imply that a worsening of the government deficit is one of the indicators for a reversal.
By definition, the CA is equal to gross national savings minus gross private investment (as a percent of GDP), see equation (2). In the years prior to reversals as well as before nonreversals, gross national savings decrease. This decrease is somewhat steeper in the reversal case than in the non-reversal case. Investment, on the other hand, does not show a decline in these years, and remains relatively stable. Its level is somewhat higher in the case of a reversal. The figure shows a moderate rise in the reversal case but the t-tests (Appendix C)
indicate that this rise is not significant. Hence, the worsening of the CA before reversals and non-reversals is due to a drop in savings rather than a rise in investment.
By definition (equation (2)), part of private savings is related to household consumption. Consumption before reversals shows a moderate rise while it falls slightly before non-reversals. The t-tests are not significant though.
In general, there are no substantial differences in the exports to GDP ratios between the two sub-samples. The ratio of imports to GDP increases in both cases; the rise before the reversal occurs at a higher level. Furthermore, the net exports to GDP ratio shows almost the same pattern as the CA in case of a reversal. The same holds for the trade balance. This just reflects the fact that CA movements are mostly driven by trade.
The short-term interest rate is quite stable before reversals, whereas it decreases in the case of non-reversals (the t-statistics are, however, not significant). Inflation, on the other hand, starts decreasing before non-reversals, but does not show a clear pattern otherwise. The real interest rate follows a similar path to that of the nominal rate.
Purchases of foreign portfolio investment assets slightly decrease before reversals, whereas sales of portfolio investment liabilities abroad increase substantially (implying a rising indebtedness to the rest of the world). In this way an increase in the CA deficit is partly financed (see equation (3)). There are no significant differences in trends to be noted before reversal and non-reversals.
Summing up, the macroeconomic variables that most significantly show different patterns before reversals and non-reversals appear to be: the CA deficit, the output gap, the real effective exchange rate and the government balance.
In order to verify whether the above-mentioned variables do indeed help predict the occurrence of a CA reversal, we carry out a probit analysis where the likelihood of a CA reversal is related to macroeconomic developments. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if there is a CA reversal and 0 if there is a non-reversal. Estimation including the full set of potential explanatory variables is not possible because of the limited number of observations (around 30). To conserve degrees of freedom, we experimented with different subsets of variables (not reported) and determined which variables performed best. This first-step analysis resulted in the following selection of four candidate indicators of CA reversals:
1. CA t-3,t-1 : The average CA-balance/GDP ratio during the past three years (
2. GAP t-3,t-1 : The average output gap during the past three years (
3. ∆ REER t-3,t-1 : The average change of the real effective exchange rate during the past three years; an increase means appreciation of the currency ( 4. GOV t-3,t-1, ∆ GOV t-3,t-1 : The average level and change of the government balance to GDP ratio during the past three years, respectively ( Note that all explanatory variables have been lagged to avoid problems of endogeneity. We average three lagged observations of each explanatory variable because the limited number of observations prevents separate inclusion.
9 All explanatory variables were tested for unit roots (not reported) and were found to be stationary.
The estimation results for this set of four explanatory variables are given in the first three columns of Table 3 . The government balance is not found to be significant (Table 3 , models 2 and 3) and it moreover affects the significance of the lagged CA. This may be due to multicollinearity (though the correlation between CA and GOV is only 0.27). The preferred model excludes the government balance (model 1). The negative marginal effect of the lagged CA balance implies that a higher CA deficit increases the probability of a CA reversal. The positive effect of the output gap means that if the output gap goes up (i.e. there is less excess capacity in the economy), a reversal is more likely to occur. The negative effect of REER implies that a negative change in the real exchange rate (hence, a depreciation) increases the probability of a CA reversal.
[ Table 3 about here]
In sum, the probit regression confirms most of the inferences based on the stylized facts. The likelihood of a CA reversal increases as the CA deficit worsens, the economy gets overheated and the exchange rate starts to depreciate.
We also investigate whether the exchange rate regime makes a difference for the probabilities of a CA reversal. Therefore we define two dummy variables, PEG and MOV, which take the value of 1 if the exchange rate system is a peg and a moving band, respectively. The values of these dummies are 0 if the exchange rate system is any other than a peg or a moving band. In our sample the most common regime is a crawling peg.
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Exchange rate regime classifications are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) .
We re-estimate our preferred model (model 1) adding interaction terms for the regime dummies with the three explanatory variables. We interact one explanatory variable at a time, to preserve sufficient observations. Column (4) shows the results with the lagged current account deficit interacted with the regime dummies. The estimated marginal effects are significant and positive. This implies that under a peg or moving band regime, a large CA deficit is less of an indicator for an upcoming CA reversal than it is under a crawling peg (in the latter case the marginal effect is -0.233). The interaction of the output gap with the exchange rate regime (column 5) shows that under a moving band an overheating of the economy does not increase the probability of a reversal as much as it does under a crawling peg. The interaction term with the peg is not statistically significant. Finally, interaction of the regime dummies with the real effective exchange rate development does not yield statistically significant results (column 6). Interacting all three explanatory variables with the regime dummies at once did not yield reliable results due to limited degrees of freedom (model 7).
Finally, we examine whether the financial openness of a country matters for the probability of a CA reversal. How open a country is for cross-border financial transactions should affect capital flows across countries, and thereby the current account. We expect that if capital can flow in and out of a country smoothly, current account adjustments can take place gradually and constantly over time, in an orderly fashion, without the sudden shocks that characterize CA reversals.
We re-estimate model ( Table 3 , model 8. The interaction terms are not significant, while the coefficients for the original three explanatory variables remain significant and in the order of magnitude as in model 1. However, the variable FINOPEN itself is statistically significant and negative, and its magnitude is economically significant as well. This confirms our expectation that financial openness of a country lowers the imminence of CA reversals.
Effects of reversals
In this subsection we focus on the stylized facts of macroeconomic trends after reversals and non-reversals to give an idea of the impact of CA reversals on the economy.
By construction, current account deficits after reversals decline significantly (see the significance tests in Appendix C), whereas in the case of non-reversals the CA deficit is more persistent.
The average fall in real GDP growth is significant and more substantial in the first year after a reversal whereas it is not after a non-reversal. This observation suggests that CA reversals on average have negative effects on GDP growth. However, following a substantial fall in output growth in year 1, growth picks up again and reaches its pre-reversal level in year 3.
The significantly negative output gap after a reversal differs considerably from the almost zero gap in the case of a non-reversal. This corroborates the fear that a CA reversal may lead to a recession. Only in years 4 and 5 after a reversal does the negative output gap disappear ( 2.17 − and 1.56 respectively; figures are not reported in the summary statistics table).
In the first year after the reversal, the depreciation of the real effective exchange rate reaches its peak. In the following two years, however, the depreciation levels off. In the nonreversal case, there is no significant depreciation.
In the first year after the reversal, the inflation rate increases sharply because of the currency depreciation. This inflation hike is absent in the non-reversal case. The nominal interest rate exhibits the same trend as inflation because of the inflation premium and possibly reflecting a monetary policy tightening in response to higher inflation.
In sum, the above analysis shows that CA reversals are often followed by significant falls in GDP growth and increases in excess capacity; reversals thus may precede recessions. Table 4 gives details on the incidence of real GDP growth losses and real depreciations in our sample of reversals. In the first year after a reversal, for instance, in 50 percent of the (40 nonmissing) cases there was a real GDP growth loss of 1.94% or more. In 25 percent of the cases the loss was 3.55% or more. In the second year after the reversal, these losses amounted to 1.39% and 3.65%, respectively. In the third year after the reversal, there was some recovery in output, so that the real GDP growth losses compared to the reversal year were somewhat less (0.15% and -2.01%, respectively). These figures thus confirm the detrimental effect of CA reversals on economic growth for at least half of the cases. Reversals also require significant real depreciations that help exports but at the same time cause inflation and higher interest rates. Table 4 shows that in 50 percent of the cases a reversal in the current account was followed by a real depreciation in the three years after, amounting to 2.78% or more, and in the worst 1% cases even 44.07% or more. However, there is no close linkage between the seriousness of growth losses and depreciation. The lower panel of Table 4 shows that recessions (i.e. above-median growth losses) occur both together with and without depreciations, in one out of four to five reversal cases, while depreciations occur relatively often (in one out of three to four cases) when there is no recession. This corroborates to some extent the findings of Croke et al. (2005) , see Section 2.
[ Table 4 about here]
We also calculate the average real GDP growth and real depreciation effects for the three major exchange rate regimes in our dataset: peg, crawling peg, and moving band ( Figure   2 ). These (admittedly small sub-sample) averages suggest that the timing of the output growth loss is concentrated in the first year under a crawling peg, is divided over the first two years under a moving band, whereas it is more prolonged and increasing towards the third year under a peg. The depreciation is also much more substantial and increasing till the third year under a peg. This reflects itself in a sharper reversion in the current account under the peg.
Note however, that we only have a limited number of observations of reversals under a peg (7).
[ Figure 2 ]
Implications for the US case

The current account deficit
The analysis of the OECD countries´ experience could provide some clue about the imminence of a current account reversal in the US. Figure 3a below presents, in line with our previous analysis, the recent developments of the US current account, the real effective exchange rate of the dollar, the output gap, and the federal budget deficit of the US.
[ Figure 3a about here]
The developments of these macroeconomic factors resemble (to some extent) the stylized facts of the OECD average dynamics in the pre-reversal period described in Section 4. The current account deficit is progressively increasing. The US output gap is expected to become positive (as in the pre-reversal period where economies become overheated).
Moreover, the dollar has been depreciating since 2001 and the US government deficit is growing. In sum, all 'symptoms' of an upcoming current account reversal are present in the US. Figure 3b plots the probability of a reversal for the US over time, i.e the sample period on which our preferred model (1) in Table 3 [ Figure 3b about here]
However, there are reasons to assume that the US is different from the average OECD economy. We give the arguments in the next subsection.
To what extent is the US case unique?
As set out in Section 4 on the theoretical framework (equation 7), the sensitivity of a country's real exchange rate to the net foreign assets position, given by parameter α , is essential for the sustainability of a current account deficit. In this section we will argue that this parameter is likely to be relatively small for the United States due to some countryspecific factors that make the US case unique. The implication is that the usual stylized facts of CA reversals that have been found for OECD countries in this paper may not fully apply to the US.
The major reason for the assertion that the US may be a special case, in the sense that parameter α is relatively small, is that the US dollar is and remains the major international currency.
First, dollar assets account for a substantial fraction of foreign exchange assets in other countries' portfolios (Debelle and Galati, 2005 oil contracts in euros the position of the dollar as the main reserve currency is not likely to be threatened in the years to come.
Second, it is remarkable that the US debt position is largely denominated in dollars
and not so much in foreign currencies, as is the case for many other countries. This in itself already serves as a good illustration of the confidence that is attached to the US dollar as well as of the other countries' willingness to accept US dollars. Table 5 presents some figures on US liabilities and assets denominated in dollars. This includes both liabilities of US residents to foreigners and foreign assets held by US residents.
[ Table 5 about here]
The overall external debt position of the US could be regarded as an indicator of the sensitivity of the US as a debtor for a depreciation of the dollar. As can be seen from Table 5 [ Figure 5 about here]
Fourth, if more US foreign liabilities than US foreign assets are denominated in dollars, a depreciation of the dollar would improve the net international investment position of the US, not deteriorate it. This is also exceptional compared to many other countries. It follows from the analysis above that US foreign liabilities are only slightly more denominated in dollars than US foreign assets, so that a depreciation of the dollar is likely to improve the net international investment position of the US slightly (Tille, 2003) .
Fifth, thus far the US has been able to benefit from a persistent yield gap between the returns earned on its international assets and those paid on its liabilities. Consequently, the US continued to receive a positive net income despite its rising net foreign liabilities position.
This has not been the case for other countries with current account deficits and makes the US case also in this respect unique (Debelle and Galati, 2005) .
Finally, in the perception of market participants the US are in a way too big to fail.
This could affect the sensitivity of the exchange rate for the net investment position (hence, α ). If the dollar depreciates sharply, this shock will have to be absorbed by the financial system, i.e. the financial markets and the financial infrastructure (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005) .
This might entail disruptions, to be dealt with by the financial system. To a large extent the outcome depends on China, which is one of the major financiers of the US CA deficit. The capacity of financial markets to absorb the adjustment of this pattern in an orderly fashion is of crucial importance. Market participants, aware of the gravity of the possible consequences of a fall of the dollar, might be reluctant to change perceptions on the dollar too abruptly. A gradual change would at least be in the interest of market participants themselves, as the financial system would be better able to deal with the consequences.
In sum, these special factors indicate that the US dollar enjoys a strong and central position in the international financial system. The currency's attractiveness as an international store of wealth makes it relatively easy for the US to borrow. If so, a CA deficit may be more sustainable for the US than for the average OECD country. In terms of equation (7), parameter α may be somewhat smaller for the US than for other countries. In that case, the prediction of our model of a US CA reversal could also be premature.
Apart from the uniqueness of the US case, some other general caveats could also be made saying that it is hard to predict reversals for any country, based on our econometric analysis of historical reversals. First, the analysis is partial, as it focuses on the reduced-form impact of variables on the probability of a CA reversal, without specifying all structural relationships explicitly. Second, no forward-looking variables have been used, such as expectations. Third, the usual caveat applies that there is no reasons to expect that economies in the future will behave exactly like they did in the past. These observations suggest that caution is warranted when using models such as ours for making predictions.
Conclusion
This paper analysed current account deficit (CA) reversals in 29 OECD countries during a period of four decades. The CA reversals were defined using similar criteria as previously in the empirical literature. We additionally constructed a control group of non-reversals in order to differentiate between large deficits that reverse and large deficits that are persistent.
First, we described the stylized facts of macroeconomic developments in the build-up to CA reversals vis-à-vis non-reversals in our sample. This g ave an idea which macroeconomic developments are symptomatic for upcoming reversals. A probit analysis of the probability of reversals vis-à-vis non-reversals confirmed that a high CA deficit, absence of spare capacity in the economy, and a beginning real depreciation significantly increase the likelihood of an upcoming reversal. The presence of a double deficit was not found to be a significant determinant. A country's exchange rate system was found to affect the importance of CA deficit and output gap levels for this likelihood. The financial openness of a country was found to lower the imminence of a CA reversal.
Next, we studied macroeconomic developments after reversals in our sample. We observed that CA adjustments lead to recessions and severe currency devaluations in half of the reversal cases in our sample.
Finally, we discussed the implication of our results for the present US CA deficit. Our impression is that the symptoms of an upcoming US CA reversal are already more or less present. The US CA deficit is large and growing, the dollar is already depreciating, and there is little spare capacity left in the US economy. Whether such a reversal will indeed manifest itself is a difficult question to answer because of several caveats, one of which concerning the fact that the US is a special case in several respects. We enumerate several of the factors that make the US and the dollar special and are inclined to conclude from this that these factors mitigate the imminence of a very sharp CA reversal in the US due to the central position of the US within the global economy and the special role of the dollar in the financial system. Appendix A 
Appendix B
Annual data was collected for the period 1960-2004. Table B .1 gives the data description and sources. Explanatory note: ** (*) denotes statistical significance --at the 1% (5%) level --of the inequality of the mean or median with respect to the Reversal year (year 0). Inequality of the means and medians was tested using a ttest and a non-parametric 2-sample median test, respectively. a) Number of years relative to reversal year (=0). Explanatory note: ** (*) denotes statistical significance --at the 1% (5%) level --of the inequality of the mean or median with respect to the Reversal year (year 0). Inequality of the means and medians was tested using a ttest and a non-parametric 2-sample median test, respectively. a) Number of years relative to reversal year (=0).
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